Framing and Voting

EPSA 2024

Nicolai Berk

Immigration Policy Lab & Public Policy Group, ETH Zurich

2024-06-07

Why Framing?

Trump on Immigration

people are coming in, and they’re killing our citizens

Biden on Immigration

he was separating babies from their mothers

Framing and Voting

Defining ‘Framing’

“Framing is the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy”

— Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson (1997), 567

Why Framing Effects on Voting?

Figure 1: The Spatial Model under Different Frames

The Partisan View


Hypotheses

H1: Framing Affects Voting

Voters presented with a frame supporting a party’s position are more likely to vote for that party.

H2: Cue-Taking

Learning that an in-party/out-party supports an issue makes voters more/less favorable of the issue.

H3: Partisan Moderation

The effect of framing on voting behavior is weaker among respondents perceiving the party as part of their in-group.

Peterson and Simonovits (2018)


  • Frame effect on candidate preferences in the US
  • Exposure to frame condition, followed by conjoint
  • Finding: limited impact

Experimental Design

Overview

Scenario: Hypothetical Policy


Bundestag discusses Wealth Taxation

[Image of Bundestag]

The Bundestag is currently debating a legislative proposal that would introduce a tax on high wealth. Accordingly, all assets over 20 million euros should be taxed at 0.5% per year.


Other policy scenarios:

  • speed limit on highways
  • asylum definition
  • federal school policies
  • public health insurance

Treatment: Frames

Pro-Frame

Proponents argue that wealth taxes could make a significant contribution to reducing inequality in Germany. Currently, the richest 10% own about 67% of wealth, compared to about 1% for the poorest half of the population. A redistributed wealth tax could almost double the disposable wealth of the lower half of the population.

Contra-Frame

Critics argue that a wealth tax endangers economic stability. The wealthy would move their capital abroad to avoid taxation. This would reduce investments and thus weaken Germany as a business location. As a result, economic growth and jobs are threatened.

Treatment: Party Position


Manipulation Checks

Framing Effect on Attitudes I

Figure 2: Frame Effect on Issue Attitude, by Inparty Position

Frame Effect on Attitudes II

Figure 3: Framing Effects on Attitudes

Effects of Party Position Information

Figure 4: Information Effect on Perceived Party Position

Results

Framing Effects on PTV

Figure 5: Main Effect of Frame on PTV

Interaction Effects

Table 1: Framing Effects on PTV
Simple Controls Interaction Partisans
Frame Supports Party 0.682 -0.450 -0.959 -0.135
(1.357) (0.937) (1.339) (1.350)
Inparty 51.955*** 51.457*** 59.097***
(0.937) (1.324) (1.342)
Frame X Inparty 0.996 0.629
(1.874) (1.883)
Num.Obs. 2799 2799 2799 2166
R2 0.000 0.524 0.524 0.649
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Cue Taking

Figure 6: Attitude towards policy, Pre and post party info, by party ID and position”

Party vs. Policy Attachment - A Tradeoff?

Figure 7: Effect of Frame on Vote by Party Cue Effect. Visualization using the interflex package from Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2019).

Summary of Results


H1: Framing Affects Voting ❌

H2: Cue-Taking ✅

H3: Partisan Moderation ❌


Bonus: no tradeoff of cue-taking vs issue voting

Limitations


  • Only moderate framing effect on attitudes
  • Single-issue setup
  • No measures of partisanship

Implications


  • Extends study of framing effects to party evaluations in multi-party, moderately polarized context
  • Underlines stability of partisan support
  • Shows that party cues persist even when respondents are aware of discrepancy
  • Suggests that partisans can tolerate incongruence

Thank you!


This research was generously supported by

Resources

Boudreau, Cheryl, and Scott A. MacKenzie. 2014. “Informing the Electorate? How Party Cues and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion about Initiatives.” American Journal of Political Science 58 (1): 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12054.
Bullock, John G. 2011. “Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate.” American Political Science Review 105 (3): 496–515. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000165.
———. 2020. “Party Cues.” In The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion, edited by Elizabeth Suhay, Bernard Grofman, and Alexander H. Trechsel, 128–50. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190860806.013.2.
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 2021. “Wahl-O-Mat Zur Bundestagswahl 2021.” https://www.wahl-o-mat.de/bundestagswahl2021/app/main_app.html.
Busby, Ethan, D. Flynn, James N. Druckman, and P. D’Angelo. 2018. “Studying Framing Effects on Political Preferences.” Doing News Framing Analysis II: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, 27–50.
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo24047989.html.
Hainmueller, Jens, Jonathan Mummolo, and Yiqing Xu. 2019. “How Much Should We Trust Estimates from Multiplicative Interaction Models? Simple Tools to Improve Empirical Practice.” Political Analysis 27 (2): 163–92. https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2018.46.
Leeper, Thomas J., and Rune Slothuus. 2020. “How the News Media Persuades: Framing Effects and Beyond.” In The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion, edited by Elizabeth Suhay, Bernard Grofman, and Alexander H. Trechsel, 0. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190860806.013.4.
Lenz, Gabriel S. 2012. Follow the Leader?: How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Performance. Chicago Studies in American Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo11644533.html.
Nelson, Thomas E., Zoe M. Oxley, and Rosalee A. Clawson. 1997. “Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects.” Political Behavior 19 (3): 221–46. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024834831093.
Peterson, Erik, and Gabor Simonovits. 2018. “The Electoral Consequences of Issue Frames.” The Journal of Politics 80 (4): 1283–96. https://doi.org/10.1086/698886.

Appendix

Heterogeneity: Political Knowledge

Figure 8: Moderation of Framing Effect by Political Knowledge

IV Estimates

Table 2: Instrumental Variable Estimate of Attitudinal Effect on Vote Intention
tinytable_6jkbfyg6ct9pzina961c
2nd Stage + Controls + Interaction Inparty Only
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Attitude 0.188+ 0.106* 0.144* 0.143*
Salience 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inparty 0.590*** 0.590***
Attitude X Inparty −0.077
Num.Obs. 2799 2771 2771 1415
FE: topic X X X